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Parties legally bound to unsigned put and call option 
 
The point at which the parties to a negotiation for the sale of land are legally bound can often be 
difficult to judge. This is particularly so where the parties have agreed a lawyer is to formalise 
the agreement between them. When the parties have not agreed all matters relating to the 
transaction, interesting questions arise as to what terms regulate the relationship. In Moffatt 
Property Development Group Pty Ltd v Hebron Park Pty Ltd [2009] QCA 60 the Queensland 
Court of Appeal considered first, whether there was a binding agreement to sell and secondly, 
how the relationship would be regulated in the absence of express agreement in relation to many 
of the terms. 
 
Facts  
Hebron Park was the registered proprietor of a parcel of 20 acres of rural residential land on the 
Queensland Sunshine Coast. In July 2007, Moffatt a property developer first became interested 
in purchasing the land when the matter was raised with it by an agent acting on behalf of Hebron 
Park. These initial negotiations were disbanded when Hebron Park began negotiations with 
another interested purchaser. Negotiations with the second potential buyer were not successful 
and in March 2008, the agent of Hebron Park again contacted Moffatt which was still interested 
in buying the land. 
On 4 April 2008, Moffatt forwarded a letter to Hebron Park’s agent outlining its terms. This offer 
was not accepted but negotiations continued. On 8 April another letter with revised terms was 
forwarded by Moffatt to Hebron Park’s agent, containing the ACN of Moffatt and details of the 
proposal. The letter clearly identified the land and purchase price, confirmed Moffatt would pay 
a non-refundable deposit on signing the contract and described the settlement date as 12 months 
from the date of contract. The letter also confirmed the offer was in the form of a put and call 
option and that Moffatt required security in the form of a caveat or mortgage over the land. The 
offer was described as unconditional and a final offer and required Hebron Park to sign the letter 
if it accepted the offer. The letter provided that “[i]f the vender accepts this offer… we will 
instruct our Lawyer to prepare the contract documentation.” The offer contained in this letter was 
accepted on behalf of Hebron Park by an express statement to that effect and the signature of its 
director.  
Subsequently, Hebron Park asked the agent whether Moffatt would “let the deal go” upon 
payment of costs incurred. Moffatt would not do so and sought specific performance of the 
contract. The trial judge decided there was a binding agreement and ordered specific 
performance of it.  
Hebron Park appealed the decision and argued that the letter of 8 April was not intended to 
constitute a legally binding agreement. Amongst other things, it argued that the there could be no 
intention to be bound in circumstances where the formalities required by the Property Agents 
and Motor Dealers Act 2000 (Qld) (“the PAMDA”) were not complied with. Hebron Park’s 
second argument was that even if there was an intention to be bound, the terms were not 
sufficiently certain. Third, it argued that the agreement was not enforceable because there was no 
sufficient note or memorandum to satisfy s 59 of the Property Law Act 1974 (Qld). The Court of 
Appeal unanimously decided Hebron Park’s appeal should be dismissed.  
 
Intention to be bound 
As the parties had agreed that a formal contract should be entered into, argument surrounding 
whether there was an intention to be legally bound focused on the three categories of cases 
outlined in the High Court decision in Masters v Cameron (1951) 91 CLR 353 at 360-361. 
Moffatt argued that the case fell within the second category; that there was a binding contract as 
the parties had agreed upon all the terms and did not intend to depart from their agreement but 
had made performance of one or more terms conditional on the signing of a formal contract. 
Hebron Park argued that the arrangement here was one falling within the third category; that 
there was no intention to be bound until a formal contract was signed. It was argued (at [14]) that 
there could be no concluded agreement in circumstances where the contemplated final contract 
was the put and call option not the letter of 8 April (at [14]). It was also argued that because the 
letter provided for payment of the deposit on signing of the formal contract not the letter and also 
because calculation of the settlement date was by reference to the signing of the formal contract, 
that there could be no agreement to be bound at this stage (at [14]). Further argument was put 
that in circumstances where the sale relates to land there is something akin to a presumption of 
fact that there is no intention to be bound until the formal contract is signed (at [15]) and that the 
trial judge had erred in not relying on the decision of Marek v Australian Conference Association 
Pty Ltd [1994] 2 Qd R 521 in resolving this issue (at [17]).  
In Marek, the court suggested that where there is an expectation the usual REIQ contract is to be 
executed, then there will be a strong inference there is no intention to be bound until that contract 
is executed. Also, where solicitors are involved, it is less likely the parties intend to be bound 
until the formal contract is signed. The suggestion is that it is a rare case where the parties will be 
bound before the formal contract for the sale of land is signed (at [15]). 
The Court of Appeal found any argument by Hebron Park that the trial judge had erred in 
“failing to appreciate that he was bound by the authority of Marek to regard a putative agreement 
for the sale of land which contemplates the execution of a formal contract as presumptively 
within the third category of contracts discussed in Masters v Cameron” was without 
consequence (at [19]). The Court of Appeal distinguished Marek as on the facts before it, the 
parties were not negotiating through lawyers, there was no obvious contemplation of the use of a 
standard form REIQ contract and no evidence the terms of the option were to be the subject of 
any further negotiation between the parties (at [24]). 
The Court of Appeal referred to S J Mackie Pty Ltd v Dalziell Medical Practice Pty Ltd [1989] 2 
Qd R 87 and Teviot Downs Estate Pty Ltd & Anor v MTAA Superannuation Fund (Flagstone 
Creek and Spring Mountain Park) Property Pty Ltd [2004] QCA 57, and confirmed that “there is 
a strong traditional expectation that in the negotiation of sales of land the parties do not intend to 
be bound until a formal contract is executed”. However, whether there is such an expectation so 
that the parties can be said to be negotiating in accordance with a traditional or common practice 
is a matter to be determined on the facts of the particular case (at [22]).  
While accepting there is a strong traditional expectation in negotiating land sales, the court 
referred (at [22]) to the statement of McHugh JA (with whom Kirby P and Glass JA agreed) in 
GR Securities Pty Ltd v Baulkham Hills Private Hospital Pty Ltd (1986) 40 NSWLR 631 at 634-
635 which the court confirmed was accepted as correct in Teviot Downs  that: 
The decisive issue is always the intention of the parties which must be objectively 
ascertained from the terms of the document when read in light of the surrounding 
circumstances: Godecke v Kirwan (1973) 129 CLR 629 at 638: Air Great Lakes Pty Ltd v 
K S Easter (Holdings) Pty Ltd (1985) 2 NSWLR 309 at 332-334,337. If the terms of a 
document indicate that the parties intended to be bound immediately, effect must be 
given to that intention irrespective of the subject matter, magnitude or complexity of the 
transaction. 
This approach is consistent with the decision of the High Court in Niesmann v Collingridge 
(1921) 29 CLR177 which the trial judge and Court of Appeal found similar to the facts of the 
case before them (at [25]). Any argument by Hebron Park that the case did not fit neatly within 
the second of the Masters v Cameron categories was rejected by the court. The court confirmed 
strict categorisation was a fruitless exercise as the assessment was simply one of the objective 
intention of the parties (at [38]). 
In assessing the intention of the parties the Court of Appeal found that: 
(i) the director of Hebron Park accepted the ‘unconditional offer’ without reservation and a 
binding agreement was formed immediately. As a result of the form of words used, there 
was an unequivocal expression of intention to enter a binding contract (at [26]).  
(ii) the parties actions could be viewed in light of the negotiations which had been aborted by 
Hebron Park in 2007.  It was possible to conclude that given that 12 months had elapsed 
both parties were concerned to reach a commitment and bring the negotiations to a close 
(at [27]). 
(iii) There was no evidence this was a case where further negotiation was essential and the 
parties clearly contemplated co-operating to implement the agreement by the signing of 
the further contract (at [30]). An absence of agreement on many matters may point to a 
lack of intention to be bound, but that was not the case here. While the precise dates for 
payment of the deposit and settlement arrangements and the terms of the option were not 
included in the letter of 8 April, there was an obligation implied into the contract to co-
operate to ensure the other party obtained the benefit of the contract (at [34]). The 
argument put forward that the need to draft the put and call option would require further 
negotiation and agreement was rejected. The lawyer for Moffatt had authority to include 
terms which were “reasonable and relevant to the Put and Call contemplated by the letter 
of 8 April 2008” and any disputes could be adjudicated by the court” (at [36]).    
(iv) The court confirmed (at [33]) that “there [was] a clear indication that the exercise to be 
devolved upon Moffatt’s lawyer was a drafting exercise intended to facilitate the 
mechanical aspects involved in the completion of the transaction to which the parties had 
made a binding commitment”.  
Property Agents and Motor Dealers Act 
The court briefly considered the impact of PAMDA on the transaction, a matter not explored at 
the trial. The court confirmed that a failure to comply with PAMDA did not provide a basis for 
concluding there was no intention on the part of the parties to enter a binding agreement under 
the common law, but the consequences of a failure to comply with the legislation was that the 
purchaser had a right to terminate the contract (at [39]).  
The court provided some insight to their future construction of PAMDA by stating that “this is 
not a case of the kind spoken of in the relevant provisions of PAMDA where the contract is 
‘given to the buyer by the seller’. This is not a case of a sale of a residence to a consumer but of 
an acquisition of stock by a developer” (at [40]).  
There are several points that can be made about this statement. First the statement highlights that 
where a buyer prepares and sends a proposed contract to the seller for execution there is no 
requirement for the seller to comply with s 366 – s366B of PAMDA. Second, where no proposed 
contract is prepared but correspondence contains terms negotiated between the parties, there is 
no requirement to comply with s 366 – s 366B. Presumably the underlying rationale is that the 
parties will need to comply when the proposed contract is drafted and sent to the buyer for 
execution. Third, the view that PAMDA does not apply to contracts between developers and 
sellers is of concern. The primary requirement for the operation of the Warning Statement 
provisions of PAMDA is that the contract concerns a sale of residential land. There is no 
qualification evident in the legislation that the buyer must be a consumer. The fact there is no 
distinction in the legislation between a private sale and one to a developer was confirmed by 
Fryberg J in Hedley v BCRP [2008] QSC 261.  
 
Uncertainty or incompleteness of terms 
Arguments relating to uncertainty were focused on a failure to identify the consideration for the 
grant of the option and the particular details surrounding the exercise of the option. The Court of 
Appeal confirmed that the agreement was certain and that the mechanical details could be 
“supplied by implied terms and considerations of reasonableness which obviated the need for 
further express agreement” (at [56]).  
On the first point the court confirmed that the mutual exchange of promises constituted sufficient 
consideration to bind the parties (at [47]). The option was to be exercised by any form of notice 
(at [48]). Hebron Park’s argument that the agreement was uncertain because it did not specify 
when the option was to be exercised was also rejected. The option had to be exercised within a 
reasonable time. As the letter made it clear that the conveyance was to take place 12 months 
from the date of contract, the option had to be exercised in sufficient time to allow this to occur 
(at [50]).  
The argument by Hebron Park that there were contradictory provisions relating to the deposit 
also was rejected. This argument arose because the letter of 8 April 2008 provided the deposit 
was non refundable and also provided that a mortgage or caveat was to be provided to secure its 
repayment. It was clear from the correspondence between the parties that the deposit was 
intended to be non-refundable except in the case where Hebron Park sold the land to a third party 
(at [52]). The possibility that the security might take the form of a mortgage or caveat did not 
make the agreement uncertain. The mode of performance was a matter of choice for Hebron Park 
(at [52]). 
The court also found that despite the lack of explanation of the terms relating to the put and call 
entered into, there was no uncertainty as to what constituted a put and call option which had a 
well understood meaning. Each party had an unconditional right to require the other to buy or 
sell the land (at [53]). 
 
Property Law Act  
Section 59 of the Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) requires a contract for the sale of land or a 
memorandum or note of the contract to be in writing and signed by the party to be charged or 
their lawfully authorised agent. Hebron Park argued the letter of 8 April 2008 was insufficient as 
a memorandum because it did not identify the purchasing entity which it argued, might have 
been selected by the “Moffatt Group” (at [58]). The letter of 8 April 2008 was written on 
letterhead styled “Moffatt Property Development Group” and included the ACN of Moffatt 
Property Development Group Pty Ltd. The court found the purchaser was sufficiently identified. 
 
Comment 
This decision highlights that parties in the negotiation phase of a transaction must be particularly 
mindful of the possibility of being bound well before formal documentation is prepared or 
signed. The decision makes it clear that the parties do not need to address all issues before a 
binding agreement arises. The court is prepared to imply obligations to overcome many 
deficiencies. If the parties do not intend to be bound until formalisation of the contract this 
should be clearly stated at the commencement of negotiations and in all correspondence. 
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